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Abstract. In this paper, we provide a Dynamic Programming algorithm for on-
line monitoring of the state robustness of Metric Temporal Logic specifications
with past time operators. We compute the robustness of MTL with unbounded
past and bounded future temporal operators (MTL<+∞+pt ) over sampled traces of
Cyber-Physical Systems. We implemented our tool in Matlab as a Simulink block
that can be used in any Simulink model. We experimentally demonstrate that the
overhead of the MTL<+∞+pt robustness monitoring is acceptable for certain classes
of practical specifications.
1 Introduction
Modern airplanes, automobiles and medical devices are prime examples of safety criti-
cal Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Nowadays, the majority of safety critical functions
in such systems is controlled by embedded computers. Due to the critical nature of these
components, it is of paramount importance to verify the functional correctness of the
embedded software. However, as the number of computer controlled components in-
creases so does the complexity of the verification of functional correctness. Moreover,
the verification problem of most classes of CPS is even an undecidable problem [1].
As an alternative to verification and off-line testing, runtime monitoring has been
proposed. The underlying idea is that given a set of formal requirements, these require-
ments are analyzed at runtime by an independent monitor and if a violation is detected,
it is reported to a supervisor. The supervisor can then decide on remedial actions to
fix the problem or reduce its impact to the system. The monitoring problem has been
extensively studied [2–14] for the cases where the formal requirements are expressed
in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [15] or in Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) [16].
In this paper, we revisit the MTL runtime monitoring problem when targeted to
CPS. In particular, we claim that the classical Boolean semantics (or even three val-
ued semantics) are not sufficiently informative for CPS behaviors. For instance, con-
sider the specification “After a takeoff command is received, then reach altitude of 600ft
within 5 minutes” for an autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) as introduced
in [8]. Clearly, knowing that the specification failed or passed at runtime is important.
However, more useful information from the perspective of the supervisor would be the
knowledge of how far is the aircraft from satisfying the requirement. More specifically,
-10ft from the requirement of 600ft at 1 min away from the 5 min threshold should
potentially be less alarming than -100ft at exactly the same time. A supervisor that has
a model of the dynamics of the aircraft can determine whether the UAV can climb 100ft
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2within 1 min or not. We remark that the determination of the climb rate can only oc-
cur at runtime since this depends on the atmospheric parameters, the payload of the
UAV, etc. Hence, the climb rate cannot be a precomputed parameter unless it is very
conservatively set.
Our goal is to construct MTL monitors for estimating the robustness of satisfaction
[17–19]. Temporal logic robustness gives a quantitative interpretation of satisfaction of
an MTL formula. In detail, if an MTL formula valuates to positive robustness ε, then
the specification is true and, moreover, the state sequences can tolerate perturbations
up to ε and still satisfy the specification. Similarly, if the robustness is negative, then
the specification is false and, moreover, the state sequences under ε perturbations still
do not satisfy the specification. Thus, robust semantics can be used to give quantitative
values to the satisfaction of MTL formulas when the target is CPS.
The challenge here is that automata based monitors [13, 14] cannot be synthesized
for computing the robustness valuations. Therefore, formula rewriting methods [11] or
dynamic programming [9] methods must be used. Here, we take the latter approach for
combined unbounded past time and bounded future time MTL specifications. Since we
are working with CPS, we assume that it is possible - if desired - to have a model pre-
dictive component in the system [20] which will provide a finite horizon prediction of
the system behavior. That finite horizon prediction could be appended with the observed
system behavior to provide a robustness estimate of a likely system behavior. Hence,
it becomes possible to monitor specifications such as “If at anytime in the past a take-
off command is issued, then within 5 min the altitude of 600ft is reached”. Thus, such
requirements can now be monitored using only the actual observed system behavior or
the observed system behavior with the predicted system behavior.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows: We provide a dynamic program-
ming algorithm for on-line monitoring of the robustness metric of MTL formulas with
bounded future and unbounded past. In addition, we provide a Matlab/Simulink tool-
box that can be used in any Simulink model for runtime monitoring of MTL robustness.
The memory usage of our method is bounded and its runtime overhead is negligible for
practical applications. Additional benefits in utilizing an on-line monitor are that it can
be used in temporal logic testing algorithms [21, 22], where it may be desirable that the
simulation stops as soon as the property is violated, as well as in feedback control for
MTL specifications. Although temporal logic robustness has been considered in pre-
vious works [17–19], the solutions were provided for off-line testing. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to solve the on-line MTL robustness monitoring
problem efficiently.
2 Problem Formulation
In the following, we represent the set of natural numbers including zero by N and the
finite interval of N up to m by Nm = {0, 1, . . . ,m}. In this work, we consider monitoring
of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). We assume that we have access to some discrete time
execution or simulation traces of the CPS. We view (execution or simulation) traces as
timed state sequences T = T0T1T2 . . . Tm = (τ0, s0) (τ1, s1) (τ2, s2) . . . (τm, sm) where
for each k ∈ Nm, τk ∈ R≥0 is a time stamp and sk ∈ S is a vector containing the
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Fig. 1. Overview of the solution of the MTL<+∞+pt on-line monitoring problem. The monitored
robustness values could be used as feedback to the CPS or it could be plotted to be observed by a
human supervisor if needed.
values of the state variables of the system at each sampling instance k. For example,
for m = 2, the trace T = (0, (2, 0.34))(0.1, (3, 0.356))(0.2, (2, 0.36)) captures the finite
time execution of a CPS with two state variables in the vector sk: one ranging over the
natural numbers N and the other over the reals R. That is, for k = 1, the state of the
system at time τ1 = 0.1 was s1 = (3, 0.356) ∈ N×R. We further assume that S = (S , d)
is a generalized quasi-metric space [23]. The existence of metrics is necessary so that
distances can be defined for quantitative valuations of the atomic propositions [18, 21].
Throughout the paper, the variable i, which ranges over N, is used to represent the
current simulation step or the current index of the sampling process. We assume a
fixed sampling period for the monitored system. Thus, there exists a fixed time period
between consecutive time stamps. For the fixed time period ∆t > 0, for all i ≥ 0, we
have τi+1 − τi = ∆t (or equivalently τi = i∆t). As a result, we can simply compute each
time stamp τi knowing the trace index (or simulation step) i by multiplication (τi = i∆t).
Therefore, we use the trace index (simulation step i) as the reference of time.
The property of interest is stated in Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) with bounded fu-
ture and unbounded past (MTL<+∞+pt ) for timed state sequences [11]. More specifically,
at each time i, we would like to monitor safety requirements represented as MTL<+∞+pt
formulas. These formulas capture safety properties of the system, such as bounded reac-
tivity, which can be periodically analyzed for violation. In our formulation, we use the
robust (quantitative) semantics [18] that quantify the distance between a given execu-
tion trace of a CPS and all the execution traces that violate the property. The robustness
of a formula JϕK with respect to a trace T at time i is a value that measures how far is
the trace from the satisfaction/falsification. This measure is an extension of boolean val-
ues representing satisfaction or falsification which is used in conventional monitoring.
A positive robustness value means that the trace satisfies the property and a negative
robustness means that the specification is not satisfied.
Our goal in this paper is to provide monitoring tools for temporal logic robustness.
We assume that at each time i, the CPS outputs its current state si along with a finite
prediction si+1, si+2, . . ., si+Hrz of horizon length Hrz ∈ N (see Fig. 1). The horizon
length Hrz will be formally defined in Sec. 4; however, informally, it is the required
number of samples after time i so that any future requirements in the MTL specification
φ are resolved, i.e., the horizon depends on the structure of the formula φ, Hrz = hrz(φ).
4When dealing with CPS, there exist numerous methods by which such a prediction
horizon (forecasting) can be computed [24–26].
Next, we formally define the main problem presented in this paper.
Problem 1 (MTL<+∞+pt Robustness Monitoring) Given an MTL<+∞+pt specification ϕ, a
sampling instance i and an execution trace T = T0T1 . . .Tm such that m = i + hrz(ϕ),
compute the current robustness estimate [[ϕ]](T , i) at time τi.
Intuitively, ϕ represents a system invariant that must hold at every point in the
system execution. This can also be viewed as testing for the specification robustness
[[ϕ]](T , 0), where  is the operator for “always in the future” and ϕ is an arbitrary
MTL<+∞+pt specification. However, instead of caring about the satisfaction of the formula
at the beginning of the time, we care about the potential of violating ϕ for which we
design an on-line monitor.
Overview of solution and summary of contributions: We provide an on-line moni-
toring approach for computing the robustness of an MTL<+∞+pt formula with respect to
execution traces of a CPS. An overview of the solution for the MTL<+∞+pt on-line mon-
itoring problem appears in Fig. 1. Our method monitors the behavior of a CPS as it
executes. Our toolbox is also useful for applications where Simulink models are actu-
ally used for process monitoring (and not simulation). In addition, it can also be used
for code generation for general MTL<+∞+pt monitors for deployment on actual systems.
Our method computes the robustness of invariants [[ϕ]](T , i) by storing previous speci-
fication robustness values – if needed – and by only utilizing a bounded number of pairs
of the execution trace THst, . . . ,THrz where Hst ∈ Ni and it will be formally defined in
Sec. 4. Our monitor uses bounded memory and, in the worst case, it has quadratic time
complexity that depends on the magnitude of Hrz − Hst. In principle, our solution for
robustness monitoring is inspired by the boolean temporal logic monitoring algorithm
in [2].
3 Robustness of Metric Temporal Logic Specifications
In digital control and monitoring of CPS, it is inevitable that physical quantities are
measured through a sampling process. As mentioned in the Problem Formulation sec-
tion, when we mention time, we are actually referring to the corresponding sampling
index i. With a slight abuse of notation and under the assumption of constant sampling
rate, an execution trace T can also be represented by a function s : Ni+Hrz → S . The
view of the sequence s0s1 . . . si+Hrz as a function s simplifies the presentation of the
robust semantics for MTL.
Using a metric d [23], we can define a distance function that captures how far away
a point x ∈ X is from a set S ⊆ X. Intuitively, the distance function assigns positive
values when x is in the set S and negative values when x is outside the set S . The metric
d must be at least a generalized quasi-metric as described in [21] which also includes
the case where d is a metric as it was introduced in [18].
5Definition 1 (Signed Distance). Let x ∈ X be a point, S ⊆ X be a set and d be a metric.
Then, we define the Signed Distance from x to S to be
Distd(x, S ) :=
{− inf{d(x, y) | y ∈ S } if x < S
inf{d(x, y) | y ∈ X\S } if x ∈ S
where inf is the infimum.
Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) was introduced by Koymans [16] to reason about
the quantitative timing properties of boolean signals. In this paper, we use the standard
fragment of MTL with bounded future, but also we allow the use of past time operators.
Definition 2 (MTL<+∞+pt Syntax). Let AP be the set of atomic propositions and I be
any non-empty interval of N, and I be any non-empty interval of N ∪ {+∞}. The set
MTL<+∞+pt formulas is inductively defined as ϕ ::= > | p | ¬ϕ | ψ ∨ ϕ | ψUIϕ | ψSIϕ
where p ∈ AP and > stands for true.
Note that we use the number of samples to represent the time interval constraints of
temporal operators. For example assume that ∆t = 0.1, then the MTL formula ^[0,0.5]a
where the timing constraints are over time is instead represented by ^[0,5]a in MTL<+∞+pt .
The propositional operators conjunction (∧) and implication (→) are defined the
usual way. All other bounded future temporal operators can be syntactically defined
using Until (UI), where  (Next), ^ (Eventually), and  (Always) are defined as ϕ ≡
>U[1,1]ϕ, ^Iϕ ≡ >UIϕ, and Iϕ ≡ ¬^I¬ϕ respectively. The intuitive meaning of
the ψU[a,b]ϕ operator at sampling time i is a follows: ψ has to hold at least until ϕ
becomes true within the time interval of [i + a, i + b] in the future. Similarly, all other
bounded/unbounded past temporal operators can be defined using Since (SI), where (Previous),  (Eventually in the past), and  (Always in the past) are defined as
ϕ ≡ >S[1,1]ϕ, Iϕ ≡ >SIϕ, and Iϕ ≡ ¬I¬ϕ respectively. The intuitive meaning
of the ψS[a,b]ϕ operator at sampling time i is as follows: since ϕ becomes true within
the interval [i − b, i − a] in the past, ψ must hold till now (current time i).
MTL<+∞+pt can state requirements over the observable trajectories of a CPS. In order
to capture these requirements, each predicate p ∈ AP is mapped to a subset of the
metric space X. We use an observation map O to interpret each predicate p ∈ AP. In
other words, the observation map is defined as O : AP → P(X) such that for each
p ∈ AP the corresponding set is O(p). Here, P(S ) denotes the powerset of a set S . We
define the robust valuation of an MTL<+∞+pt formula ϕ over a trace s as follows [17].
Definition 3 (MTL<+∞+pt Robustness Semantics). Let s be a trace s : N → X, and O
be an observation map O : AP → P(X), then the robust semantics of any formula ϕ ∈
6MTL<+∞+pt with respect to s is recursively defined as:
[[>]](s, i) := +∞
[[p]](s, i) := Distd(s(i),O(p))J¬ϕK(s, i) := −JϕK(s, i)Jψ ∨ ϕK(s, i) := JψK(s, i) unionsq JϕK(s, i)
JψU[l,u]ϕK(s, i) := ⊔i+uj=i+l (JϕK(s, j) u l j−1k=i JψK(s, k))JψS[l′,u′〉ϕK(s, i) := ⊔i−l′j=max{0,i−u′} (JϕK(s, j) u lik= j+1JψK(s, k))
where unionsq stands for max, u stands for min, p ∈ AP, l, u, l′ ∈ N and u′ ∈ N ∪ {∞}.
Furthermore, the symbol 〉 in S[l′,u′〉 will be ) when u′ = +∞ and ] when u′ , +∞.
We should point out that we use the extended definition of maximum (unionsq) and min-
imum (u), with slight abuse of notation, we let max(∅) = −∞ and min(∅) = +∞. i.e.,
over empty sets we treat min and max as infimum and supremum, respectively. For
exact definition of infimum and supremum see [27].
4 Robustness Monitoring of MTL<+∞
+pt
4.1 Finite horizon and history of MTL<+∞
+pt
For each MTL<+∞+pt formula ψ we define the finite horizon hrz(ψ) as the number of
samples we need to consider in the future. In MTL, the satisfaction of the formula
depends on what will happen in the future. In bounded MTL, the finite horizon hrz(ψ)
is the number of steps (samples) which we need to consider in the future in order to
evaluate the formula ψ at the current time i. In other words, hrz(ψ) is the number of
steps into the future for which the truth value of the sub-formula ψ depends on [2].
Similarly, we define the finite history hst(ψ) of ψ as the number of samples we need
to look into the past. That is, the number of steps in the past for which the truth value
of the sub-formula ψ depends on. Intuitively, the hst(ψ) is the size of the history we
need to consider in order to keep track of what happened in the past to evaluate the
formula ψ at present time. The finite horizon and the history can be defined recursively.
We define hrz(ψ) (similar to h(ψ) in [2]) and we add the recursive definition of hst(ψ)
in the following:
hrz(p) = 0 hst(p) = 0
hrz(¬ψ) = hrz(ψ) hst(¬ψ) = hst(ψ)
hrz(ψ OP ϕ) = max{hrz(ψ), hrz(ϕ)} hst(ψ OP ϕ) = max{hst(ψ), hst(ϕ)}
hrz(ψU[l,u]ϕ) = max{hrz(ψ) + u − 1, hrz(ϕ) + u} hst(ψU[l,u]ϕ) = max{hst(ψ), hst(ϕ)}
hrz(ψS[l′,u′〉ϕ) = max{hrz(ψ), hrz(ϕ)}
hst(ψS[l′,u′〉ϕ) =
{
max{hst(ψ) + u′ − 1, hst(ϕ) + u′} if u′ , +∞
max{hst(ψ) + l′ − 1, hst(ϕ) + l′} if u′ = +∞
7Table 1. Pre Vector and Robustness Table
Pre[k] Tk, j column j⇒ -2 -1 0 1 2
row k ⇓ Time(i) i − 2 i − 1 i i + 1 i + 2
ψ1 = ϕ ψ2 ∧ ψ3 JϕK(s, i − 2) JϕK(s, i − 1) JϕK(s, i) JϕK(s, i + 1) JϕK(s, i + 2)
ψ2 [1,2]q Jψ2K(s, i − 2) Jψ2K(s, i − 1) Jψ2K(s, i) Jψ2K(s, i + 1) Jψ2K(s, i + 2)Jψ3K(s, i − 3) ψ3 [0,+∞) p Jψ3K(s, i − 2) Jψ3K(s, i − 1) Jψ3K(s, i) Jψ3K(s, i + 1) Jψ3K(s, i + 2)
ψ4 p Jψ4K(s, i − 2) Jψ4K(s, i − 1) Jψ4K(s, i) Jψ4K(s, i + 1) Jψ4K(s, i + 2)
ψ5 q Jψ5K(s, i − 2) Jψ5K(s, i − 1) Jψ5K(s, i) Jψ5K(s, i + 1) Jψ5K(s, i + 2)
where p ∈ AP. Here, OP is any binary operator in propositional logic, and ψ, ϕ are
MTL<+∞+pt formulas. For the unbounded S[0,+∞) operator, the computation of finite his-
tory is more involved and needs more explanation. Namely, we need to restate the dy-
namic programming algorithm for monitoring a sub-formula ψS[0,+∞)ϕ based on the fol-
lowing works [9, 5]. According to the robustness semantics, the robustness of ψS[0,+∞)ϕ
at time i is as follows:
JψS[0,+∞)ϕK(s, i) = ⊔ij=0 (JϕK(s, j) u lik= j+1JψK(s, k))
also robustness of ψS[0,+∞)ϕ at time i − 1 is
JψS[0,+∞)ϕK(s, i − 1) = ⊔i−1j=0 (JϕK(s, j) u li−1k= j+1JψK(s, k))
Thus, we can rewrite JψS[0,+∞)ϕK(s, i) as
JψS[0,+∞)ϕK(s, i) = JϕK(s, i) unionsq (JψK(s, i) u (⊔i−1j=0 (JϕK(s, j) u li−1k= j+1JψK(s, k)))
)
=
= JϕK(s, i) unionsq (JψK(s, i) u (JψS[0,+∞)ϕK(s, i − 1)))
Therefore, similar to [5] we recursively update the robustness of ψS[0,+∞)ϕ at the
current time i and save it in a variable called “Pre” to reuse it for the computation of the
next time step (see [5] for more details). As a result, when we have an unbounded past
time operator, we do not need the full history table. However, if the formula contains a
nested future time operator, we need to extend the history to be long enough to contain
the actual values. In other words, although for unbounded past time operators we do not
need the whole history table, we should still extend the history to be able to store the
actual simulation values (not the predicted values) in “Pre”.
4.2 Robustness Computation Algorithm
For each MTL<+∞+pt formula ϕ we construct a table called Robustness Table with width
of Hst + 1 + Hrz, where Hrz = hrz(ϕ) is the finite horizon of the specification formula
ϕ, and, Hst = Hrz + hst(ϕ), where hst(ϕ) is the finite history of the specification ϕ. Hst
is extended conservatively due to the fact that “Pre” value can only store the robustness
8Algorithm 1 On-Line Monitor
Input: ϕ, s′i = si si+1 . . . si+Hrz, d, O; Global variables: T , Pre; Output: T1,0(robustness value).
procedure Monitor(ϕ, s′i ,d,O)
1: for k ← 1 to |ϕ| do
2: Pre(k)← Tk,(−Hst+hst(ϕk))
3: end for
4: for j← 1 − Hst to Hrz do
5: for k ← 1 to |ϕ| do
6: if ϕk = p ∈ AP then
7: Tk, j−1 ← Tk, j
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: for k ← |ϕ| down to 1 do
12: if ϕk = ϕmS[l′ ,u′〉ϕn then
13: for j← −Hst + hst(ϕk) to Hrz do
14: Tk, j ← CR(ϕk, j, s′i ,d,O)
15: end for
16: else
17: for j ← Hrz down to − Hst +
hst(ϕk) do
18: Tk, j ← CR(ϕk, j, s′i ,d,O)
19: end for
20: end if
21: end for
22: return T1,0
end procedure
values corresponding to the actual simulation. The height of the robustness table is the
size of the formula ϕ (|ϕ|), where |ϕ| is the number of sub-formulas of ϕ including itself.
For example, assume we have a formula ϕ = [0,+∞) p∧[1,2]q and we intend to compute
[[ϕ]](T , i) at each time i. In formula ϕ, Hst = 2 and Hrz = 2. Since ϕ has unbounded
past-time operators, it needs the Pre vector as well as the Robustness Table. The Pre
vector appended to the Robustness Table is presented in Table 1. In particular, the Pre
vector contains the value of past sub-formulas from the beginning of the time up to the
current time.
In the following, we explain how the values of Table 2, the robustness table, are
computed using Algorithms 1 and 2. In order to make our algorithms more readable,
we used a vector to show the CPS output si, si+1, . . ., si+Hrz to the monitoring (see Fig.
1). We define a vector s′i = sisi+1 . . . si+Hrz which appends current state si with predic-
tions si+1, si+2, . . ., si+Hrz. In Table 1, i is the current simulation step which corresponds
to column 0. At each simulation step i, for each unbounded past time sub-formula φ, we
first save the values of the column −Hst + hst(φ) in the Pre vector (Algorithm 1 lines
1-3) since the column −Hst + hst(φ) contains the robustness value of φ from the begin-
ning of the simulation. We need the Pre vector to compute the robustness of φ at the
next sampling time using the dynamic programming method. In the above example, for
Table 2. Robustness Computation of each table entries (Gray cells are unused)
Tk, j i − 2 i − 1 i i + 1 i + 2
k ⇓, j⇒ j = −2 j = −1 j = 0 j = 1 j = 2
Pre[1] T2,−2 u T3,−2 T2,−1 u T3,−1 T2,0 u T3,0 T2,1 u T3,1 T2,2 u T3,2
Pre[2] T5,−1 u T5,0 T5,0 u T5,1 T5,1 u T5,2 T5,2 +∞
Pre[3] Pre[3]uT4,−2 T3,−2 u T4,−1 T3,−1 u T4,0 T3,0 u T4,1 T3,1 u T4,2
Pre[4] Distd(si−2,O(p)) Distd(si−1,O(p)) Distd(si,O(p)) Distd(si+1,O(p)) Distd(si+2,O(p))
Pre[5] Distd(si−2,O(q)) Distd(si−1,O(q)) Distd(si,O(q)) Distd(si+1,O(q)) Distd(si+2,O(q))
9Algorithm 2 Robustness Computation (CR)
Input: ϕk, j, s′i = si si+1 . . . si+Hrz, d, O; Global variables: T , Pre; Output: Tk, j.
procedure CR(ϕk , j, s′i ,d,O)
1: if ϕk = > then Tk, j ← +∞
2: else if ϕk = p ∈ AP then
3: if j >= 0 then
4: Tk, j ← Distd(si+ j,O(p))
5: end if
6: else if ϕk = ¬ϕm then
7: Tk, j ← −Tm, j
8: else if ϕk = ϕm ∨ ϕn then
9: Tk, j ← Tm, j unionsq Tn, j
10: else if ϕmU[l,u]ϕn then
11: if j + l ≤ Hrz then
12: tmpmin ← d j≤ j′< j+l Tm, j′
13: Tk, j = −∞
14: for j′ ← j + l to min{Hrz, j + u} do
15: Tk, j ← Tk, j unionsq (tmpmin u Tn, j′ )
16: tmpmin = tmpmin u Tm, j′
17: end for
18: else
19: Tk, j = −∞
20: end if
21: else if ϕmS[l′ ,u′〉ϕn then
22: tmpmin ← d j−l′< j′≤ j Tm, j′
23: if u′ , +∞ then
24: Tk, j = −∞
25: for j′ ← j − l′ down to j − u′ do
26: Tk, j ← Tk, j unionsq (tmpmin u Tn, j′ )
27: tmpmin = tmpmin u Tm, j′
28: end for
29: else
30: if j = −Hst + hst(ϕk) then
31: tmpS ← Pre[k] u Tm, j
32: else
33: tmpS ← Tk, j−1 u Tm, j
34: end if
35: Tk, j ← (Tn, j−l′ u tmpmin) unionsq tmpS
36: end if
37: end if
38: return Tk, j
end procedure
[0,+∞) p the value at column −2 is saved in Pre to be used during robustness computa-
tion. Then, we shift all the robustness table entries of the predicates by one position to
the left (Algorithm 1, lines 4-10). Then the loop (Algorithm 1, lines 11-21) recursively
calls Algorithm 2 to fill the robustness table for each sub-formula from bottom to top.
Each call of Algorithm 2 (CR) computes each table entry Tk, j (see tables 1,2) where
column j is the horizon/history index and row k is the sub-formula index. For past sub-
formulas the table entries are computed from left to right (Algorithm 1, lines 13-15),
and for future sub-formulas the table entries are computed from right to left (Algorithm
1, lines 17-19). New values for predicates (according to execution traces) will be placed
in column 0 and the predicted values of the predicates will be saved in columns 1 to Hrz
(Algorithm 2, lines 2-5). Table 2 shows the updates of predicate values in rows 4, and 5
which correspond to Algorithm 2, line 4.
In the following, we explain how the CR Algorithm 2 computes the MTL robust-
ness values for three different cases of MTL:
Case 1 (Lines 10-20): The robustness of bounded future temporal sub-formulas with
interval [l, u] at each column j is computed given the values of its operands for columns
j up-to min{ j + u,Hrz} (Line 14). For example, this case is used in Table 2 to compute
the robustness of sub-formula ψ2 = [1,2]q from right to left. Case 1 in CR Algorithm
is similar to the DP-TALIRO algorithm [28].
Case 2 (Lines 23-28): The robustness of bounded past temporal sub-formulas with in-
terval [l′, u′] at each column j is computed given the values of its operands for columns
j down-to j − u′ (Line 25).
10
Case 3 (Lines 30-36): The robustness of unbounded past temporal sub-formulas with
interval [l′,+∞) for column j is computed using the stored value in column j − 1 in
dynamic programming fashion (Line 33) and using the Pre vector (Line 31). For exam-
ple, Case 3 is used to compute the robustness of ψ3 = [0,+∞] p using Pre[3] from left
to right in Table 2.
Finally, we update table entries for the top row which corresponds to ψ1 = ϕ. Since
its corresponding operator ∧ is propositional (Algorithm 2 Lines 6-9), we can update
its value from any direction. The high level explanation of Algorithm 1 is described as
follows:
1. Store values of column −Hst + hst(φk) for each unbounded past sub-formula φk in
Pre[k] and shift the table entries of predicates one to the left (Lines 1-10).
2. For each row i from |ϕ| to 1 compute the robustness values according to:
(a) If ϕi is a future temporal operator, for each column j from Hrz down to −Hst +
hst(ϕi), update table entry Ti, j using Algorithm 2.
(b) If ϕi is a past temporal operator, for each column j from −Hst + hst(ϕi) up to
Hrz update table entry Ti, j using Algorithm 2.
3. Return the robustness (T1,0).
We provided the proof of this section in Appendix.
5 Experimental Analysis and Case Studies
5.1 Runtime Overhead
First, we measure the overhead of the proposed monitoring framework on a slightly
modified version of the Automatic Transmission (AT) model provided by Mathworks
as a Simulink demo1. The experiments were conducted on a Windows 7, Intel Core2
Quad (2.99 GHz) with 8 GB RAM.
The physical model of the AT system has two continuous (real-valued) state vari-
ables which are also its monitored outputs: the speed of the engine ω and the speed
of the vehicle v. The model includes an automatic transmission controller that exhibits
both continuous and discrete behavior. It is a typical CPS model and specifications over
both boolean and continuous variables can be formalized. However, since the valuation
of the robustness of predicates over continuous state variables is computationally more
expensive than a boolean valuation, we consider only specifications over continuous
state variables for the impact analysis.
We introduce our MTL<+∞+pt monitoring block in the AT model and test the perfor-
mance over a set of specifications. In order to test the runtime overhead of our work,
we artificially generate 30 different MTL<+∞+pt formulas based on typical critical safety
formulas to show that the runtime overhead depends on both of the size of the formula
and the horizon/history. We test our method for 100 runs of monitoring algorithm for
each specification (formula), and for each run we use 100 simulation steps. Then, we
compute the mean and variance of the overhead for each simulation step which is the
1 Available at: http://www.mathworks.com/help/simulink/examples/
modeling-an-automatic-transmission-controller.html
11
Table 3. The overhead on each simulation step on the Automatic Transmission model with spec-
ifications of increasing length. Table entries are in milliseconds.
# H=1,000 H=2,000 H=10,000
E U E U E U
Mean Var. Mean Var. Mean Var. Mean Var. Mean Var. Mean Var.
φ1(H) 2.39 0.00 4.83 0.00 8.03 0.00 15.8 0.001 188.8 0.001 358.5 0.036
φ3(H) 4.24 0.00 7.5 0.001 12.7 0.00 25.09 0.005 314.4 0.01 599 0.665
φ5(H) 4.66 0.00 8.36 0.001 14.01 0.00 27.8 0.005 309.2 0.077 650 0.014
φ7(H) 4.95 0.00 8.94 0.00 14.83 0.00 29.33 0.006 311 0.013 674.2 0.033
φ9(H) 5.23 0.00 9.46 0.001 15.4 0.001 30.56 0.007 317.5 0.011 683.5 0.698
execution time of Algorithm 1 in Table 3. In this table, the overhead is measured on
specifications that contain either nested Until operators (U columns) or nested Eventu-
ally operators (E columns).
We generate 30 formulas according to the following templates:
– E formulas: φn(H) = p j −→ ψn(H/n)
where H ∈ N is the finite horizon of the formula. In Table 3, we used 1,000, 2,000
and 10,000 for the size of the horizon. Here, p j is an arbitrary predicate and ψn(H/n)
is defined recursively as follows:
ψ1(h) = ^[0,h] pk and ψn(h) = ^[0,h](pl ∧ ψn−1(h)), for 1 < n ≤ 9
where h = H/n, i.e., the finite horizon H divided by the number of nested sub-
formulas n and pk, pl are arbitrary predicates.
– U formulas: φn(H) = p j −→ ψn(H/n)
where H ∈ N is the finite horizon of the formula. In Table 3, we used 1,000, 2,000
and 10,000 for the size of the horizon of H. Here, p j is an arbitrary predicate and
ψn(H/n) is defined recursively as follows:
ψ1(h) = pkU[0,h] pl and ψn(h) = pmU[0,h](pn ∧ ψn−1(Y)), for 1 < n ≤ 9
where h = H/n and pk, pl, pm, pm are arbitrary predicates.
As illustrated in Table 3, the computational complexity of the monitoring algorithm
is closely related to the horizon and history size. Since the algorithm’s complexity is of
order O(n2) where n is the horizon/history, the added overhead (in worst case execution)
is quadratic in terms of the size of the horizon for some formulas in Table 3 (like φ1(H)).
Moreover, in most cases, the impact of the number of nested temporal operators is
not significant compared to the size of horizon/history windows. From Table 3, we
notice that when the horizon and history size is less than 2,000, the overhead for each
simulation step is negligible with our prototype implementation. Furthermore, for most
practical reactivity requirements, it is quite unlikely that even a window size of 2,000
sampling points is necessary. Therefore, the method could be utilized in real world
monitoring applications.
5.2 Case Study
In the following, we utilize the monitoring method on an industrial size high-fidelity en-
gine model. The model is part of the SimuQuest Enginuity [29] Matlab/Simulink tool
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package. The Enginuity tool package includes a library of modules for engine compo-
nent blocks. It also includes pre-assembled models for standard engine configurations.
In this work, we use the Port Fuel Injected (PFI) spark ignition, 4 cylinder inline en-
gine configuration. It models the effects of combustion from first physics principles on a
cylinder-by-cylinder basis, while also including regression models for particularly com-
plex physical phenomena. The model includes a tire-model, brake system model, and a
drive train model (including final drive, torque converter and transmission). The input
to the system is the throttle schedule. The output is the normalized air-to-fuel(A/F) ra-
tio. Simulink reports that this is a 56 state model. Note that this number represents only
the visible states. It is possible that more states are present in the blackbox s-functions
which are not accessible. This is a high dimensional non-linear system for which reach-
ability analysis is very difficult. It also includes lookup tables, non-linear components,
and inputs that affect the switching guards.
Enginuity High-Fidelity Engine Model with On-Line Monitoring
on_line monitoring
lambda robustness
engine_torque
engine_speed
manifold_pressure
mass_air_flow
lambda
o2_sensor_voltage
gear
vehicle_speed
input throttle
[torque]
[manifold_press]
[mass_air_flow]
[lambda_exhaust]
[engine_speed]
[o2_sensor_voltage]
[gear_active]
[vehicle_speed]
[manifold_press]
[vehicle_speed]
[lambda_exhaust]
[mass_air_flow]
[gear_active]
[torque]
[engine_speed]
[o2_sensor_voltage]
engine speed [rpm]
manifold pressure [Pa]
mass air flow [kg/s]
torque [Nm]
vehicle speed [mph]
active gear [-]
O2 sensor voltage [V]
lambda exhaust [-]
robustness
input throttle
Fig. 2. SimuQuest [29] Enginuity Matlab Simulink engine model with the on-line monitoring
block.
A specification of practical interest for an engine is the settling time for the A/F
ratio, which is the quotient between the air mass and fuel mass flow. Ideally, the nor-
malized A/F ratio λ should always be 1, indicating that the ratio of the air and fuel
flow is the same as the stoichiometric ratio. Under engine operating conditions, this
output fluctuates ±%10. We add the on-line monitoring block to the Simulink model as
presented in Fig. 2.
Our goal is to monitor the engine while allowing temporary fluctuations to λ. We
formally define the specification as follows:
φpt = (λ out of bounds)→ [0,1] [0,1] ¬(λ out of bounds)
Here, the formal specification states that if the A/F ratio exceeds the allowed bounds,
then the ratio should have been settled for at least one second within the last two sec-
onds.
Notice that an alternative presentation of the formula would be to use the future
eventually and always operators, i.e. the formula would be defined as follows:
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Fig. 3. Runtime monitoring of specifications φpt, φ f t and φpt f t on the high-fidelity engine model.
The figure presents a normalized stoichiometric ratio, and the corresponding robustness values for
specifications φpt, φ f t and φpt f t. Note that no predictor is utilized when computing the robustness
values.
φ f t = (λ out of bounds)→ ^[0,1][0,1]¬(λ out of bounds)
In this case, the specification states that always, if the A/F ratio output exceeds the
allowed bounds, then within one second it should settle inside the bounds and stay there
for a second.
Clearly, both φpt and φ f t are equivalent in terms of the set of traces that satisfy/falsify
each specification2. However, in real-time robustness monitoring, there is an important
distinction between the two. When the specification requires future information, either
a predictor is put in place or the semantics will handle only the current information.
In this case, without a predictor, the future time formula reduces to the propositional
formula φ f t = (λ out of bounds)→ ¬(λ out of bounds) ≡ (λ out of bounds). Therefore,
past time operators should be used. Recall that when monitoring robustness, our goal
is to provide early warning on when the specification may fail by approaching dan-
gerously an undesired threshold. In other words, the past formula allows us to reason
about the robustness of the actual system observations, while the future formula in col-
laboration with a forecast model would allow us to estimate the likely robustness. This
is in contrast to many boolean monitoring algorithms which issue an “undecided until
further notice” verdict that does not provide any actionable information.
A third alternative monitoring specification is the following formula:
2 Formally, this is the case if we ignore the first 2 seconds of the execution trace as well as the
last 2 seconds – if the execution trace is finite.
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φpt f t = [0,2]((λ out of bounds)→ ^[0,1][0,1]¬(λ out of bounds))
This specification states that at some point in the last two seconds, when λ is out
of bounds then within the next second, λ will not be out of bounds and stay there for
one second. This alternative seems to be the balance between the φpt and φ f t formulas.
Where φpt purely relies on past information, and φ f t relies on information from a pre-
dictor, φpt f t has the advantage that it utilizes both the information from the past but also
it could include information from the predictor.
An example of real-time monitoring on the high-fidelity engine model is presented
in Fig. 3. The figure illustrates the significance of using past time operators when defin-
ing specifications. Due to the lack of predictor information, the φ f t monitor falsely
returns falsification at about 4 seconds whereas the φpt monitor does not.
In the following, we analyze the overhead of the monitoring algorithm for this case
study. Since the runtime is influenced by numerous sources of nondeterminism, we ap-
ply the central limit theorem to form confidence intervals for the mean simulation run-
time when running the simulations with and without the monitor. To generate the results
in Table 4, we collected 30 samples with 100 simulation runtimes in each sample. We
note that the difference between the estimated mean simulation runtime when adding
the monitor is 0.97%. The experimental results were generated on an Intel Xeon X5647
(2.993GHz, 8 CPUs) machine with 12 GB RAM, Windows 7, and Matlab 2012a.
Table 4. Simulation runtime statistics for the high-fidelity engine model running for 35 seconds
with simulation stepsize of 0.01s. The results include the confidence intervals for the mean sim-
ulation runtime.
Simulation runtime(sec.) Est. Mean Est. Std. Dev
95% 99%
LB UB LB UB
Without monitor 10.811 0.090 10.778 10.844 10.766 10.857
With monitor 10.987 0.086 10.955 11.019 10.944 11.030
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented an algorithm for monitoring the robustness of combined past and
future MTL specifications. Our framework can incorporate predicted or estimated data
as provided by a model predictive component. We have created a Simulink toolbox
for MTL robustness monitoring which is distributed with the S-Taliro tools [30]. Our
experiments indicate that the toolbox adds minimal overhead to the simulation time of
Simulink models and it can be used for both runtime analysis of the models and for
off-line testing. Our future work will concentrate on several aspects. First, the current
version of the tool allows reasoning over timed state sequences generated under a con-
stant sampling rate. We would like to relax this constraint so that we allow arbitrary
sampling functions. Second, we would like to investigate the possibility of porting our
monitor on FPGA platforms similar to [2, 8]. Finally, we envision that utilizing infor-
mation about the system through the form of a model will permit us to move to an
event based monitoring framework while still sufficiently approximating the robustness
estimate.
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Appendix: Proof of Section 4.2
We prove by induction the correctness of Algorithms 1 and 2. We need to prove that
at each simulation step i, the returning value of the CR algorithm is the same as the
robustness value. Without loss of generality, assume i ≥ Hst; therefore, the values in the
table columns −Hst to 0 contain the robustness values based on the actual simulation.
When i < Hst then the proof is immediate by the semantics of temporal logic. We must
show that, for each sub-formula ϕk the value stored in column j of robustness table Tk, j
should be correctly computed according to the semantics
JϕkK(s, i + j) = Tk, j = CR(ϕk, j, s′i ,d,O)
given matrix T and vector Pre
Base case:
We will show that for each MTL<+∞+pt sub-formula in the form of a predicate, the value
which is returned by the CR algorithm (Algorithm 2) is equal to the semantics of the
sub-formula. Assume the sub-formula is a predicate p = ϕk, for each simulation time
i + j, the corresponding robustness value is stored in the column j of robustness table
as follows:
∀ j,−Hst ≤ j ≤ Hrz, JpK(s, i + j) = Distd(s(i + j),O(p)) = Distd(si+ j,O(p)) =
Tk, j = CR(p, j, s′i ,d,O)
Therefore, for each predicate the algorithm “CR” computes the correct robustness value.
Induction Hypothesis:
For each temporal sub-formulas ϕk, Hst − hst(ϕk) ≥ Hrz because of the fact that
Hst = Hrz + hst(ϕ) ≥ Hrz + hst(ϕk); therefore −Hst + hst(ϕk) ≤ −Hrz.
As a result, the values at the columns from −Hst up to −Hst + hst(ϕk) will only depend
on the actual simulation values, i.e., the predicates from column −Hst up to column 0
which will not change in next simulation steps. These values are shown in gray color
cells of Table 5. As a result, all the table entries from −Hst up to −Hst + hst(ϕk) will
not change (in next run) and the re-computation is not needed. Therefore, we shift
all the values of predicates one column to the left and we ignore columns −Hst to
−Hst + hst(ϕk) − 1 in our current run of Algorithm1 (Lines 13 and 17). Therefore, it is
not necessary to include the columns −Hst to −Hst + hst(ϕk)−1 in proof and Induction
Hypothesis.
For Induction Hypothesis, we assume that the value stored in the robustness table is the
semantically correct robustness value for each sub-formula ϕk:
∀ j,−Hst + hst(ϕk) ≤ j ≤ Hrz, JϕkK(s, i + j) = Tk, j = CR(ϕk, j, s′i ,d,O)
And if there exists unbounded past operator sub-formula like ϕk = ψS[l′,+∞)ϕ, we as-
sume the Pre(k) = JψS[l′,+∞)ϕK(s, i − 1 − Hst + hst(ϕk))) because it belongs to the
previous run of i − 1, i.e we store the value Tk,(−Hst+hst(ϕk)) in Pre(k) before processing
the current run (i) (see Algorithm 1 line 2).
Induction Step:
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• Negation:
∀ j,−Hst + hst(ϕk) ≤ j ≤ Hrz : JϕkK(s, i + j) = J¬ϕmK(s, i + j) =
−JϕmK(s, i + j) = −Tm, j = CR(¬ϕm, j, s′i ,d,O)
• Disjunction:
∀ j,−Hst + hst(ϕk) ≤ j ≤ Hrz : JϕkK(s, i + j) = Jϕm ∨ ϕnK(s, i + j) =JϕmK(s, i + j) unionsq JϕnK(s, i + j) = Tm, j unionsq Tn, j = CR(ϕm ∨ ϕn, j, s′i ,d,O)
• Until:
For sub-formulas of the form ϕk = ϕmU[l,u]ϕn, either the corresponding robustness
values are correctly saved in robustness matrix for ϕm, ϕn or the semantics will
satisfy the correctness if the corresponding values belong to columns beyond the
Hrz:
∀ j,−Hst + hst(ϕk) ≤ j ≤ Hrz : JϕkK = JϕmU[l,u]ϕnK(s, i + j) =⊔i+ j+u
h=i+ j+l
(JϕnK(s, h) u lh−1
r=i+ j
JϕmK(s, r)) =⊔
h∈[ j+l, j+u]∩[−Hst,Hrz](Tn,h u
lh−1
r= j
Tm,r) = CR(ϕmU[l,u]ϕn, j, s′i ,d,O)
• Bounded Since:
For bounded sub-formula ϕk = ϕmS[l,u]ϕn, the robustness is defined as follows:JϕkK(s, i + j) = JϕmS[l,u]ϕnK(s, i + j) = ⊔i+ j−lh=i+ j−u(JϕnK(s, h) u li+ jr=h+1JϕmK(s, r))
Based on IH we know that j ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕk). We must show that the values of
Tn,p for j − u ≤ p ≤ j − l satisfy Tn,p = JϕnK(s, i + p) i.e. −Hst + hst(ϕn) ≤ j − u
and also we need to show that the values of Tm,q for j − u + 1 ≤ q ≤ j satisfy
Tm,q = JϕmK(s, i + q) i.e. −Hst + hst(ϕm) ≤ j − u + 1.
We have two cases for hst(ϕk):
Case 1: hst(ϕk) = hst(ϕn) + u = max{hst(ϕn) + u, hst(ϕm) + u − 1}
According to IH, j ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕk), then j ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕn) + u. Thus j − u ≥
−Hst +hst(ϕn) which satisfies the fact that Tn,p = JϕnK(s, i+ p) for j−u ≤ p ≤ j− l.
On the other hand, in this case: hst(ϕn) + u ≥ hst(ϕm) + u − 1
According to IH, j+ Hst ≥ hst(ϕk) ≥ hst(ϕm)+u−1, i.e., j+ Hst ≥ hst(ϕm)+u−1.
Thus j − u + 1 ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕm), which satisfies the fact that Tm,q = JϕmK(s, i + q)
for j − u + 1 ≤ q ≤ j.
Table 5. Robustness Table (Unchangeable values in next runs are in gray color)
column( j)⇒ −Hst ... −Hst + hst(ϕk) ... −Hrz = −Hst + hst(ϕ) ... −1 0 1 ... Hrz
index(time)⇒ i − Hst ... i − Hst + hst(ϕk) ... i − Hrz ... i − 1 i i + 1 ... i + Hrz
Pre[1]
Pre[...]
Pre[k]
Pre[...]
Pre[|ϕ|](predicate)
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Case 2: hst(ϕk) = hst(ϕm) + u − 1 = max{hst(ϕn) + u, hst(ϕm) + u − 1}
According to IH, j ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕk) then j ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕm) + u − 1. Thus
j − u + 1 ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕm) which satisfies the fact that Tm,q = JϕmK(s, i + q) for
j − u + 1 ≤ q ≤ j. On the other hand, in this case: hst(ϕm) + u − 1 ≥ hst(ϕn) + u.
According to IH, j + Hst ≥ hst(ϕk) ≥ hst(ϕn) + u i.e j + Hst ≥ hst(ϕn) + u.
Thus j − u ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕn) which satisfies the fact that Tn,p = JϕnK(s, i + p) for
j − u ≤ p ≤ j − l.
As a result:
∀ j,−Hst + hst(ϕk) ≤ j ≤ Hrz : JϕkK(s, i + j) = JϕmS[l,u]ϕnK(s, i + j) =⊔i+ j−l
h=i+ j−u(JϕnK(s, h) u li+ jr=h+1JϕmK(s, r)) =⊔ j−l
h= j−u(Tn,h u
l j
r=h+1
Tm,r) = CR(ϕmS[l,u]ϕn, j, s′i ,d,O)
• Unbounded Since:
For unbounded sub-formula ϕk = ϕmS[l,+∞)ϕn, according to Induction Hypothesis:
Pre(k) = JϕmS[l,+∞)ϕnK(s, i − 1 − Hst + hst(ϕk))
In dynamic programming we recursively update the valueJϕmS[l,+∞)ϕnK(s, i − Hst + hst(ϕk) + x)
given the previous robustness value in the tableJϕmS[l,+∞)ϕnK(s, i − Hst + hst(ϕk) + x − 1)
(where x = 0 when we use the Pre(k))
According to Def. 3 the robustness semantics at time i + j:JϕmS[l,+∞)ϕnK(s, i + j) = ⊔i+ j−lh=0 (JϕnK(s, h) u li+ jr=h+1JϕmK(s, r))
and robustness for previous time i + j − 1:JϕmS[l,+∞)ϕnK(s, i + j − 1) = ⊔i+ j−l−1h=0 (JϕnK(s, h) u li+ j−1r=h+1JϕmK(s, r))
We can define robustness value at time i + j given the value at time i + j − 1:
JϕmS[l,+∞)ϕnK(s, i + j) = ⊔i+ j−lh=0 (JϕnK(s, h) u li+ jr=h+1JϕmK(s, r)) =
=
(⊔i+ j−l−1
h=0
(JϕnK(s, h) u li+ j−1
r=h+1
JϕmK(s, r)) u JϕmK(s, i + j))⊔(JϕnK(s, i + j − l) u li+ j
r=i+ j−l+1JϕmK(s, r)) =
=
(JϕmS[l,+∞)ϕnK(s, i + j − 1) u JϕmK(s, i + j))⊔(JϕnK(s, i + j − l) u li+ j
r=i+ j−l+1JϕmK(s, r))
Based on IH, we know that j ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕk). We must show that the value
of Tn, j−l = JϕnK(s, i + j − l), i.e., −Hst + hst(ϕn) ≤ j − l and also the values of Tm,q
for j − l + 1 ≤ q ≤ j satisfy Tm,q = JϕmK(s, i + q), i.e., −Hst + hst(ϕm) ≤ j − l + 1.
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We have two cases for hst(ϕk):
Case 1: hst(ϕk) = hst(ϕn) + l = max{hst(ϕn) + l, hst(ϕm) + l − 1}
According to IH, j ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕk); therefore, j ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕn) + l and
j − l ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕn) which satisfies Tn, j−l = JϕnK(s, i + j − l). On the other
hand in this case: hst(ϕn) + l ≥ hst(ϕm) + l − 1.
According to IH, j + Hst ≥ hst(ϕk) ≥ hst(ϕm) + l− 1, i.e., j + Hst ≥ hst(ϕm) + l− 1.
Thus j − l + 1 ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕm) which satisfies the fact that Tm,q = JϕmK(s, i + q)
for j − l + 1 ≤ q ≤ j.
Case 2: hst(ϕk) = hst(ϕm) + l − 1 = max{hst(ϕn) + l, hst(ϕm) + l − 1}
According to IH, j ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕk); therefore, j ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕm) + l − 1 where
j − l + 1 ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕm) which satisfies the fact that Tm,q = JϕmK(s, i + q) for
j − l + 1 ≤ q ≤ j. On the other hand in this case: hst(ϕm) + l − 1 ≥ hst(ϕn) + l.
According to IH, j + Hst ≥ hst(ϕk) ≥ hst(ϕn) + l i.e. j + Hst ≥ hst(ϕn) + l.
thus j − l ≥ −Hst + hst(ϕn) which satisfies Tn, j−l = JϕnK(s, i + j − l)
As a result:
∀ j,−Hst + hst(ϕk) ≤ j ≤ Hrz : JϕkK(s, i + j) = JϕmS[l,+∞)ϕnK(s, i + j) =
=
(JϕmS[l,+∞)ϕnK(s, i + j − 1) u JϕmK(s, i + j))⊔(JϕnK(s, i + j − l) u li+ j
r=i+ j−l+1JϕmK(s, r)) =
=
( {Tk, j−1 if j > −Hst + hst(ϕk)
Pre[k] if j = −Hst + hst(ϕk)
}
u Tm, j
)⊔ (
Tn, j−l u
l j
r= j−l+1 Tm,r
)
=(
tmpS
)⊔ (
Tn, j−l u tmpmin
)
= CR(ϕmS[l,+∞)ϕn, j, s′i ,d,O).
